how those ideas came to be central concepts in the second half of the Twentieth Century in the GATT system. The final question addressed in this paper is whether those concepts retain validity in the Doha Round and the post-Doha world.
Cordell Hull was a Democrat from Tennessee. He was therefore from his beginning adult years a low tariff proponent as fit the pattern for Democrats not just in those days but from the earliest days of the Republic. It was after all the North that had sought protection for manufactures and the South that was more interested in exports, primarily agricultural products to be sure. Indeed, this difference goes all the way back to the Constitution itself, when it was the Southerners who backed the prohibition on export taxes.
1 In Hull's days the economic truth that a country that taxes imports will find it harder to export was instinctively understood in the South.
In his instructive Memoirs, Hull explained that before he came to Washington he had "breathed in the fire of great tariff battles-but they were battles fought on the home grounds that high tariffs or low tariffs were good or bad for the United Sates as a purely but on "trade methods, practices, and policies which in their effects are calculated to create destructive international controversies…." 3 The conference never took place, but in 1925 he introduced a resolution in the House calling for a trade conference. His addition to the draft resolution of a call for immediate unilateral reduction in U.S. tariffs "of course doomed it," as he later admitted. 4 Evidently he had even in 1925 not fully appreciated the reciprocity principle that was later to become obvious to him as Secretary of State.
Even before his 1916 House speech proposing a trade conference, Hull in 1914
wrote to Secretary of State Lansing urging the adoption of an unconditional mostfavored-nation clause. In doing so, he had three evils in mind. The first was boycotting of countries (we would call it "trade sanctions" today). The second was subsidizing exports that had the effect of destroying particular foreign industries. And the third was Imperial
Preference, under which England, its colonies, and the Commonwealth countries gave one another more favorable trade treatment than they gave others, which he considered patently unfair. 5 Here we see the birth of his passion for nondiscrimination in trade matters.
When I first became interested in trade matters, I read a bit about Cordell Hull.
But I did not spend much time exploring his ideas because, frankly, I thought they were a The second event is much more recent. With the growth of terrorism we have come to understand that the higher incomes that economic development can bring will have to be part of any long-run solution to terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere.
We now know from extensive cross-country economic studies that growth rates in the Third World are directly related to a country's openness to trade. 6 Even in this light, Hull's fixation on tariffs as a threat to peace may seem a bit shallow. But we should remember that tariffs were the only important trade barriers that he knew as a young legislator. The technology of trade protection, with its antidumping duties and the like,
had not yet taken hold. And under the gold standard, exchange restrictions were rare.
So we can conclude that Hull was ahead of his time in thinking about the noneconomic effects of rampant protectionism and especially of trade discrimination. Though the 1934 Act provided only for bilateral agreements, Hull intended to negotiate with a great many countries, and he did not intend to let third country principal suppliers get a windfall. He could avoid that problem by concessions to any given country only with respect to products on which they were a principal supplier. I have not been able to verify that that was Hull's strategy, but clearly the political vulnerabilities from applying unconditional MFN in the bilateral context was a motive for moving after
World War II to a multilateral forum. In the meantime, Hull achieved his objective of avoiding discrimination. The third change is the growing importance of trade in services. Here the protectionist mechanism does not lie in trade law at all, but rather in domestic regulation of the particular service industry. Service industries are mostly subjected to comprehensive economic regulation, best known not to trade lawyers but to specialized lawyers and bureaucrats involved in that regulation. But perhaps a more serious problem is that services negotiations fail to meet one of the conditions that were so important to
Hull that he did not draw specific attention to it. What happens in a conventional tariff round is that countries make trade-offs, seeking concessions in goods of interest to their exporters and reluctantly making concessions on goods of import-competing industries.
In other words, reciprocity works. But such reciprocity is unlikely to be present in purely sectoral negotiations.
In the Doha Round financial services negotiations, for example, developing nations have little or no interest in trying to compete in developed country financial markets because they know it would be a money-losing proposition. The reciprocity principle that served the world so well in the industrial tariff world where cross-sectoral trade-offs were the modus vivendi has little to offer in making sectoral negotiations in services a success. Sweet reason (as opposed to hard bargaining) may bring an opening of financial services markets, but reason did not play a decisive role in opening industrial markets. It is true that at the end of the financial services negotiations some cross-sectoral trade-offs may occur even though the structure of the services negotiations is sector-bysector. But the Doha Round is so complex that the opportunity for last-minute trade-offs is limited. To make trade in services negotiations productive, we have to rethink the whole basis of negotiations. In doing so, we shall probably be led to try to find a way to utilize Hull's concept of reciprocal concessions. in Geneva, may result in no major agreements being reached in the first place.
Congressional objections to U.S. negotiators' proposals have to be taken seriously because Congress has the power to terminate its advance authorization at any time. In fact, the current authorizing legislation explicitly provides that either house of the Congress can repeal the authorization outright at any time. One can, of course, make an argument that transparency is a democratic value.
But it is also true that the original idea of advance authorization was that it would be difficult to know at that early point exactly what domestic ox was likely to be gored. This idea does not seem likely to lead to fruition at this time, but domestic political changes in the United States could make it a more promising idea in the future.
in intellectual property infringement situations. 22 Another international precedent is to be found in the 1996 plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement. Article XX of that Agreement requires governments to allow suppliers to challenge breaches of the Agreement. 23 These two international precedents involve giving exporters procedural rights in an importing country, but they do not address exporters' rights in their own country. Still, they are perhaps a first step in internationalizing the understanding that international trade liberalization is often less about the international negotiating process than about providing a domestic mechanism by which exporters can be given opportunities and means to offset the political influence of import-competing firms. 
